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1 Introduction
Up until recently, assessing the quality of an article through the average quality of the journal
in which it was published was the only possible way to go. However more and more citation
indexes exist for individual publications, as for example those of the Journal of Citations
Report, Scopus, or Google Scholar. Currently, the two ways of assessing publication quality,
through the average quality of the journal or individual citations, co-exist. There has been
very few attempts to assess whether the two approaches really measure the same phenomenon.
Abramo, D’Angelo and Di Costa (2010) for instance compare Italian university rankings
obtained when using Web of Science citations and journal impact factors over 2004-2007 but
they do not control for any of the characteristics of the universities, nor of their academics.
Using an individual dataset of French academics and their publications over 1969-2008, we
provide the first econometric assessment of the determinants of the two types of measures and
we evaluate the extent to which they are substitutes or not. Importantly, we control for a
large number of co-variates at the individual level as age, gender, field of specialisation, team
size, and network.
We propose to answer three sets of questions. First, are some of the standard determi-
nants of productivity in market activities (age and gender) also determinants of productivity
in academic research, or do other variables (as typically the size of the author’s team and
network) also play an important role? Second, to what extent are publications and citations
records driven by specialisation fields? Third, do individual citations and publication scores
adjusted for journal quality measure the same dimension of academic productivity, and which
variables (age/gender, specialisation, or team size/network) drive the gap between the two?
We use an exhaustive dataset of French academic economists in 2008, their publication
records in EconLit and their Google Scholar citation indexes. Alongside the academic’s age,
age-squared and gender, we introduce a first variable specific to the organisation of labour in
academic research, which is the average number of authors per publication (we refer to this
variable as the author’s team size). We find that larger author teams have a more robust
impact on publications adjusted for journal quality and citations than standard Mincerian
determinants like age or gender. We also introduce the number of published articles and the
size of the co-author network (the author’s total number of different co-authors) as determi-
nants of the average quality of publications. We demonstrate increasing returns to scale with
respect to both variables. Academics who have published more articles and who have had
more different co-authors reach a higher average quality of publications.
Then, we introduce specialisation patterns measured by the share of each academic’s arti-
cles in each JEL (Journal of Economic Literature) classification code. It turns out that, even
if these specialisation choices do not have much impact on the overall results described above,
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some evidence of disparities between fields are observed, both in terms of publication and ci-
tation patterns. For instance, French academics specialised in the fields of “Microeconomics”
and “Labor and Demographic Economics” publish more articles, of a higher average quality,
and they are more cited than the average.
Finally, regressing citation indexes on publication scores and on the variables mentioned
above, we find that the largest part of the variance in citations is explained by publication
scores. This allows us to conclude that on the whole, publications adjusted for journal qual-
ity and citations measure the same dimension of publication productivity. Nevertheless, we
observe some non-random deviations between the two measures for specific over- or under-
cited fields and due to strong team size and network effects related to the organisation of
the research and publication activity. For a given publication record, larger team size and a
larger co-author network generate more citations. Since the publication volume and journal
quality are controlled for, we interpret this result as a pure impact of team size and network
on knowledge diffusion at identical levels of academic activity. This can emerge from two
types of effects. First, different co-authors of an article present their study in different confer-
ences, seminars, informal talks, etc. The more numerous the co-authors are, the stronger the
diffusion. Second, because academics talk about their new papers to their former co-authors,
the more numerous these latter are, the larger the knowledge diffusion to their colleagues and
their other co-authors. While these effects are fairly intuitive, our study, using both individual
publications and citations simultaneously, is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to provide
systematic evidence on them and to quantify their overall magnitude.
In the 1970s, the quantity of academics’ publications was shown to be an important
determinant of academic wages. Katz (1973) evaluates the return to an article between $18
and $102 in 1969 in one large US public university. In a multi-equation system modelling job-
quality, research productivity and earnings of a sample of 863 economists in 1966, Hansen,
Weisbrod and Strauss (1978) find that experience, measured by the number of years since
Ph.D., has a significant impact on research productivity. They also evaluate the return to
an additional published article or book at an almost 8% increase in annual earnings. From
the 1980s, the quality of publications, measured by citations, has been shown to be a more
important determinant of salaries than their quantity. On a sample of 148 full professors
of economics at seven large public universities, Hamermesh, Johnson and Weisbrod (1982)
show that citations, which they define as indirect contributions to knowledge, have a superior
effect on academic earnings than the number of publications, which they define as direct
contributions to knowledge. Diamond (1986) goes further in the analysis and estimates that
the marginal value of a citation lies between $50 and $1,300, depending on the discipline.
With a panel of 140 academic economists, Sauer (1988) confirms this existence of incentives
to knowledge growth and estimates that an individual’s return from a co-authored paper with
3
n authors is approximately 1/n times that of a single-authored paper. Finally, Kenny and
Studley (1995) show that economists’ salaries are best characterised by implicit long-term
contracts (predicted publications and citations) than by current productivity (presumably
because of mobility costs) and find an insignificant effect of field choice on academic wages.
This paper takes a similar perspective, assessing the respective roles on research productivity
of age, gender, the number of articles published, and specialisation, to which we add the role
of team size and networks.
Adopting a macro perspective, Lovell (1973) estimates production functions of publications
and citations, which he defines as contributions to economic knowledge. At the aggregate
level, considering previously published articles as the stock of capital and the number of
PhDs granted in the USA as the labour input in a Cobb-Douglas production function, he
explains the tendency of scientific literature to grow exponentially between 1895 and 1965
by the exponential growth of the labour input. Here, we take another road and study the
micro determinants of publications and citations, which have been proved to be important
determinants of academic wages and promotions and are therefore considered to be evidence
of research productivity. Hence, this allows us to shed some light on the impact on knowledge
creation and diffusion of the behaviour of academics in terms of co-authorship, specialisation
choices and research strategy in general. Recently, some studies have studied the role of
seniority (Mishra and Smyth, 2012), gender (van Arensbergen, van der Weijden and van den
Besselaar, 2012) and networks (Badar, Hite and Badir, 2012; Egghe, Guns and Rousseau,
2012) on different measures of academic productivity. However the impact of these variables
has been never studied simultaneously, with the further possible role of specialisation, which
we do here. From a policy point of view, understanding and quantifying such mechanisms is
an important step in designing a more efficient academic system.
Finally, Stigler and Friedland (1975) is the study the most closely related to ours. They
examine the citation of articles published between 1950 and 1968 in two economic sub-fields,
cited in doctorates in economics from six major US universities, to identify patterns of intel-
lectual debtors and creditors. Regressing the number of citations - considered as a measure of
intellectual influence - on the number of published articles, they find some evidence of weak
but significant increasing returns to quantity. However, their specification does not include
the age, gender, team size, and network variables we consider here.
Another contribution of this paper is the use of a new tool to measure the impact of
academics: their Google Scholar citations. Standard studies on citations use the Journal of
Citation Reports but even its latest version only refers to about 300 journals in economics,
and many less were used in most of the studies mentioned above, in which citations of and
by articles in non-referenced journals are excluded. Using Google Scholar citations presents
the decisive advantage of taking into account a much wider range of supports for both cited
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and citing articles and it also includes books, working papers, and policy reports, since all
supports on academic websites are concerned. As a consequence, Google Scholar is sometimes
considered as a better tool for comparisons across disciplines (Amara and Landry, 2012;
Harzing, 2012) and we also contribute to this emerging literature that assesses the properties
of Google Scholar citations. As regards our measures of publications adjusted for journal
quality, we use all 1206 Econlit journals, and their relative quality, which is also a large
extension with respect to previous studies. Finally, we do not restrict the academic sample
used, which can induce selection biases when, for instance, only the best universities are kept;
we consider the full sample of 2782 French academics in 2008, whether they publish a lot or
not at all.
Data and the econometric strategy are presented in sections 2 and 3, respectively. The
individual determinants of publication scores and citation indexes are analysed in section 4.
Section 5 tests the robustness of the findings when specialisation choices are taken into ac-
count. Comparing citation indexes and publication scores, section 6 analyses the patterns of
knowledge diffusion and section 7 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Measure of output
We measure the research output of the academic i in two ways: her number of publications
adjusted for journal quality and her number of citations in Google Scholar.
2.1.1 Publication records
Publication records are measured as weighted sums of articles referenced in EconLit, which
lists more than 560,000 publications in more than 1200 journals between 1969 and 2008. Three
dimensions enter the weighting of publications: the relative number of pages, the number of
authors and the quality of the journal.
We take into account the number of pages to capture the idea that longer articles contain
more ideas (normal vs short papers in the American Economic Review, for instance). However,
since the layout can be very different from one journal to another and since we do not want
to favorise some journals for that reason, the weighting is made within each journal. The
weight is the ratio of the number of pages of article a over the average number of pages of the
articles published in that journal in the same year, which assumes the consistency of editorial
policy over one year only. By contrast, differences in the length of articles between journals
(Economic Letters vs American Economic Review, for instance) are considered to be captured
directly by the journal quality index (presented below).
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We also take into account the number of authors of each article. As is standard, we assume
an equal split of the article between its authors.
Finally, we take the quality of publications into account using the Combes and Linnemer
(2010) journal weighting scheme. For robustness purposes, we compare our results using two
of their indexes assuming different degrees of convexity in the distribution of journals’ weights.
To sum up, the output of academic i is a weighted sum of her articles a:
yi =
∑
a
W (a)
n(a)
p(a)
p¯
(1)
where p(a) is the number of pages of the article, p¯ the annual average number of pages
of articles in the journal, n(a) the number of authors of the article and W (a) the journal
weighting scheme. We consider the medium and high degree of convexity of journals’ weights,
noted CLm and CLh respectively. Scores using neither journal weights nor the correction for
the relative number of pages are noted E. CLm ranges from a weight equal to 100 for the
Quarterly Journal of Economics to a weight of 4 for the last journal, passing by 55.1 for the
Journal of Labor Economics for instance. CLh ranges from 100 for the Quarterly Journal of
Economics to 0.0007 for the last journal, passing by 16.7 for the Journal of Labor Economics.
We refer to these two schemes as the “Quality” and “Top quality” publication measures
respectively. They are illustrated for the top 50 journals in Appendix A. E is referred to as
“Quantity” (which is corrected for the number of authors only).
2.1.2 Citation records
We assess citations through the Google Scholar citations of articles, books and working papers
(which we refer to as entries) written by the academics of our database. These citations were
extracted on January 2010, around two years after the date at which we want to measure
research productivity, which seems quite reasonable given the time needed for studies to be
cited.
In order to avoid problems of homonyms involving academics with identical names in fields
other than economics, we restrict the fields on Google Scholar to the “subject areas” “Business,
Administration, Finance, and Economics” and “Social Sciences, Arts, and Humanities”. To
have a period of time comparable to that used for EconLit, we only keep entries dated between
1969 and 2008.
As we did for publications, we take into account the number of authors for each entry.
However, it is no longer necessary to take into account the quality of the support or the
relative length of publications, since we assume that the number of citations directly reflects
the entry quality.
We first build an index of total citations, TCi, which is the total number of citations
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received by all academic i’s entries, each divided by its number of authors. Then, to combine
this (quality-adjusted) measure of quantity with something closer to the average quality of
publications, we use a synthetic index. We do not use the famous H-index, Hi, proposed
by Hirsh (2005), because typically two academics can have the same H-index when one of
them has some very highly-cited entries and the other not. In other words, the H-index
ignores the internal distribution of citations received by the articles used to calculate it, and
we consider that as one of its strong limits. Therefore we prefer to use the G-index, proposed
by Egghe (2006) which states that academic i has a Gi-index equal to g, which is unique, if
her g most-cited articles have received g2 citations in total, or g citations on average. It can
be shown that Gi ≥ Hi. The difference between the two indexes relates to the number of
citations received on average by the most-cited articles.
To take the number of co-authors of each article into account, we follow Schreiber (2008)
who proposes to attribute all its citations to any entry but simply a fraction of the entry
to each author. Then the H and G indexes are not necessary integers anymore, but they
keep the same signification. For instance, a G-index of 7.5 means that the academic has had
published at least 7.5 “single-author equivalent” articles with 7.5 citations each on average.
2.2 Population and descriptive statistics
The EconLit database, which enables us to compute our different scores of publication, is
matched with a list of academics in economics provided by the French Ministry of Education
and Research.1 In 2008, year for which the analysis was conducted, 2782 academics were
considered.2
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about our main dependent and independent vari-
ables. The average academic was around 47 years old, had published 3.5 (single-author
equivalent) articles referenced in the EconLit database between 1969 and 2008, had entries
cited 107 times with a G-index of 7.25 (meaning that her 7.25 most-cited entries had been
cited 7.25 times on average). In 2008, 30% of French academic economists were women and
73% had published at least one article. We refer to them as the “Published”. Also, 85%
have at least one entry with at least one citation in Google Scholar; we refer to them as the
“Cited”.
If we restrict our sample to the academics who have published at least one article refer-
enced in the EconLit database (Panel (b)), the average published author is slightly younger
(around 46 years old) and more likely to be a man (27% of women, compared with 30% for all
academics). She has published 4.8 single-author equivalent articles, has been cited 137 times
1Ministe`re de l’Enseignement Supe´rieur et de la Recherche - Direction Ge´ne´rale de la Recherche et de
l’Innovation.
2We matched data from the Universities, from the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
and from the INRA (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique).
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Table 1: Individual descriptive statistics
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. err.
Panel (a): All academics
Women 2782 0 1 0.30 0.46
Age 2782 26 85 46.87 10.79
Publisher 2782 0 1 0.73 0.44
Quantity 2782 0 78.5 3.53 6.07
Quality total score 2782 0 5866.6 59.99 209.57
Top quality total score 2782 0 3867.7 16.46 112.90
Cited 2782 0 1 0.85 0.35
Total citations 2782 0 30069.0 107.17 652.19
G-index 2782 0 165.8 7.25 10.31
GS Authors number 2782 1 6 1.96 0.65
Panel (b): Published
Women 2040 0 1 0.27 0.44
Age 2040 27 85 46.09 10.58
Quantity 2040 0.17 78.5 4.81 6.64
Quality total score 2040 0.40 5866.6 81.81 241.08
Top quality total score 2040 0 3867.7 22.45 131.34
Average quality 2040 0.65 114.2 12.03 11.20
Average top quality 2040 0 73.0 1.84 5.69
EL Authors number 2040 1 6 1.85 0.63
Network size 2040 0 53 4.12 5.35
Cited 2040 0 1 0.95 0.23
Total citations 2040 0 30069.0 137.48 758.03
G-index 2040 0 165.8 8.89 11.29
GS Authors number 2040 1 5 2.04 0.58
Panel (c): Cited
Women 2374 0 1 0.28 0.45
Age 2374 27 85 46.31 10.70
Publisher 2374 0 1 0.81 0.39
Quantity 2374 0 78.5 4.05 6.41
Quality total score 2374 0 5866.6 69.75 225.38
Top quality total score 2374 0 3867.7 19.27 122.00
Average quality 1929 0.65 114.2 12.35 11.41
Average top quality 1929 0 73.0 1.94 5.84
EL Authors number 1929 1 5 1.87 0.61
Network size 2374 0 53 3.49 5.17
Total citations 2374 0.20 30069.0 125.59 704.39
G-index 2374 0.20 165.8 8.50 10.68
GS Authors number 2374 1 5 2.05 0.58
Quantity: number of single-author equivalent articles in EconLit (E). Quality and top quality total scores:
publication scores with a low and high degree of convexity in the journal weighting scheme (CLm and CLh),
respectively. Authors number: average number of authors by article. Network size: total number of different
co-authors.
and has a G-index of 9 on average. 95% of published academics have been cited at least once
on Google Scholar. The average number of authors per article is around 2 (1.85 in EconLit,
2.04 in Google Scholar) while the average network size (total number of different co-authors)
is 4.12.
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Alternatively, if we restrict our sample to academics who have been cited at least once on
Google Scholar (Panel (c)), 81% have published at least one article and 28% are women. The
average cited academic has published 4.05 single-author equivalent articles, has been cited
126 times and has a G-index of 8.5. The average network size of cited academics is slightly
smaller (3.49 vs 4.12) than that of published academics.
Finally, Table 2 provides some simple correlations between EconLit publication scores and
Google Scholar citation indexes.3 The following observations are noteworthy. As expected,
the academics who have published more articles are more cited. The correlation between
citation indexes and publication scores is higher when the quality of journals is taken into
account with a medium degree of convexity rather than a high degree of convexity. However,
the average quality of publications is more correlated with citation indexes when there is a
high degree of convexity in the journal weighting scheme.
Table 2: Correlations of EconLit and Google Scholar indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quantity (1) 1 0.89 0.70 0.32 0.43 0.61 0.60
Quality total score (2) 1 0.93 0.72 0.77 0.64 0.64
Top quality total score (3) 1 0.85 0.94 0.59 0.60
Average quality (4) 1 0.93 0.41 0.40
Average top quality (5) 1 0.47 0.48
Total citations (6) 1 0.95
G-index (7) 1
Quantity: number of single-author equivalent articles in EconLit (E). Quality and top quality: publication
scores with a low and high degree of convexity in the journal weighting scheme total scores (CLm and CLh),
respectively. Average quality and top quality: CLm/E and CLh/E. Correlations are computed on logarithms
to match the econometric specification presented in section 3.
3 Econometric specification
For our different measures of publication scores or citation indexes, we estimate the following
specification using ordinary least squares:
log yi = β0 +β1 Genderi +β2 Agei +β3 Age
2
i +β4 log naui +β5 log(1 +Neti) +
18∑
j=1
γj
yij
yi
+ i
where yi is the publication score or citation index of academic i, Genderi is a dummy variable
taking 1 for women, naui is the average number of authors per publication by academic i and
Neti is the size of her co-authorship network, i.e., her total number of different co-authors.
4
3In logarithms to match the econometric analysis presented in section 3.
4The academics who have never co-authored an article have a network size of size 0, so we add 1 to Neti
to take its log. 1 +Neti can be seen as the total network size, including academic i who would belong to her
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Finally,
yij
yi
is the share of academic i’s output in JEL code j at the first letter level (calculated
in terms of E, the number of single-author equivalent articles published in EconLit).56
Since some academics have never published an article in EconLit or have no citation on
Google Scholar, we also take selection into account using a Heckman 2-step procedure. The
first step is the probit selection equation and the second step is the main equation augmented
by the inverse of Mills’ ratio. In the present case, this corresponds to a model where academics
who have not published or are not cited are those who do not reach a sufficient quality
threshold in their research activity, and this can be explained by the same type of variables as
those that determine the level of publication or citations. Unfortunately, for this very reason,
it is pretty difficult to find exclusion restrictions - variables that would explain the probability
of being published or cited, but not the levels. Therefore the selection effect is identified on
non-linearities only.
4 Individual determinants of publication and citation records
In this section, we analyse the individual determinants of publication and citation records by
regressing total publication scores (E - the number of single-author equivalent articles, and
CLm and CLh, the quality and top quality publication scores using a medium and a high
degree of convexity in the journal weighting scheme, respectively) and citation indexes (TC -
Google Scholar total citations discounted by the number of authors per paper and G - Google
Scholar G-index) on gender, age and its square and the average number of authors per article.
This is presented in Table 3. We also regress CLm/E and CLh/E, the average quality and
top quality of publications on the same explicative variables augmented by E (quantity) and
the network size to identify possible increasing returns to quantity and co-authorship. Since
network size is by construction highly correlated with quantity, it is included in the regressions
only when quantity is also included to identify the network effect on top of its natural quantity
effect. Except for age and gender, all variables are in logs.
Women are less productive, whatever the measure of research output. Older academics
publish more articles, which are on average of lower quality. These two effects cancel out
when the dependent variable is the total publication score taking quality of publications into
account. Older academics are also more cited (with a slightly concave effect), which could
be due to the fact that their articles were published longer ago and have therefore had more
time to be cited. Moreover, we find increasing returns to the average number of co-authors
own network in this case.
5We ignore the fields “Miscellaneous Categories” (Y) and “Other Special Topics” (Z). We also slightly
modify the codes C and D by merging code C7 (Game Theory and Bargaining Theory) and C9 (Design of
Experiments) with Microeconomics (D), which seems to us more consistent.
6We estimate the γj coefficients under the constraint
∑18
j=1 γj = 0. Therefore significance tests reported for
the γj are with respect to the average γj .
10
per article for all research output measures, except for the number of single-author equivalent
articles. A published academic who has on average two co-authors instead of only one (per
article) has 10.1% less publications but their average quality is 8.4% higher and their average
top quality is 36.8% higher.7 Her total quality and top quality publication scores are 11.4%
and 96.9% higher, respectively, while she is cited 53.4% more and has a G-index 41.8% higher.8
We also find increasing returns to the individual quantity and to the size of the co-authors’
network on the average quality of publications, and they are stronger when the journal’s
quality assessment is more selective. The more articles academics have published, the more
different co-authors they have had, the higher the average quality of their publications. Re-
searchers who have published five single-author equivalent articles instead of four have an
average quality of publications 3% higher and an average top quality of publications 15.5%
higher.9 Having a stock of five different co-authors instead of four, meaning a total network
size of 6 instead of 5, increases average publication quality by 4% and average publication top
quality by 15.5%.10
Table 3: Determinants of publication scores and citation indexes
E CLm CLh CLm/E CLh/E TCit G
Women -0.357a -0.556a -1.126a -0.106a -0.372a -0.517a -0.298a
(0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04)
Age 0.059b 0.029 -0.037 -0.048a -0.171a 0.104a 0.055b
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Age2 -0.000c -0.000 0.000 0.000a 0.001a -0.001c -0.000c
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Authors number -0.262a 0.266a 1.671a 0.200b 0.773a 1.056a 0.861a
(0.07) (0.10) (0.18) (0.09) (0.28) (0.12) (0.08)
Quantity 0.132a 0.644a
(0.03) (0.08)
Network size 0.216a 0.789a
(0.04) (0.14)
Constant -0.386 2.501a -0.504 3.134a 0.848 -0.535 -0.486
(0.59) (0.82) (1.65) (0.31) (0.95) (0.87) (0.48)
R2 0.059 0.034 0.066 0.251 0.355 0.082 0.101
Observations 2040 2040 2040 2040 2040 2374 2374
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. E = number of
single-author equivalent articles in EconLit. CLm and CLh are publication scores with a low and high degree
of convexity in the journal weighting scheme, respectively. CLm/E and CLh/E = average quality and top
quality. TC = Google Scholar total citations. G = Google Scholar G-index.
In Table 4, we repeat the same exercise as in Table 3 except that we take selection
into account using the Heckman 2-step procedure. Hence, in the first column of Table 4,
71.5−0.262 − 1, 1.50.200 − 1 and 1.50.773 − 1, respectively.
81.50.266 − 1, 1.51.671 − 1, 1.51.056 − 1 and 1.50.861 − 1, respectively.
91.250.132 − 1 and 1.250.644 − 1, respectively.
101.20.216 − 1 and 1.20.789 − 1, respectively.
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we run a probit equation of the probability of having been published, which allows us to
calculate the inverse of Mills’ ratio (“Selection”) that we include in the columns 2 to 6. The
same exercise is done for Google Scholar citation indexes in columns 7 to 9. Without clear
exclusion restrictions, the inverse of Mills’ ratio should possibly control for the presence of
non-linearities in the model.
Table 4: Determinants of publication scores and citation indexes, with selection
Prob.Pub E CLm CLh CLm/E CLh/E Prob.Cit TCit G
Women -0.405a -0.781 -1.385 -3.580b -0.477c -2.215a -0.325a -0.408 -0.083
(0.06) (0.65) (0.87) (1.63) (0.27) (0.79) (0.07) (0.71) (0.42)
Age 0.028 0.096c 0.103 0.181 -0.015 -0.008 0.006 0.100b 0.048b
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Age2 -0.000c -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Authors number -0.262a 0.267a 1.673a 0.195b 0.747a 1.056a 0.861a
(0.07) (0.10) (0.18) (0.09) (0.28) (0.12) (0.08)
Quantity 0.130a 0.634a
(0.03) (0.08)
Network size 0.219a 0.805a
(0.04) (0.14)
Selection 2.204 4.300 12.736 1.925 9.565b -1.251 -2.465
(3.38) (4.51) (8.42) (1.39) (3.95) (8.31) (4.93)
Constant 0.571 -1.625 0.084 -7.662c 2.054b -4.517c 1.628b -0.367 -0.155
(0.59) (1.76) (2.36) (4.49) (0.85) (2.44) (0.77) (1.27) (0.75)
R2 0.060 0.035 0.068 0.251 0.356 0.082 0.101
Observations 2782 2040 2040 2040 2040 2040 2782 2374 2374
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. E: Number of
single-author equivalent articles in EconLit. CLm and CLh: Publication scores with a low and high degree of
convexity in the journal weighting scheme, respectively. CLm/E and CLh/E: average quality and top quality.
TC: Google Scholar total citations. G: Google Scholar G-index.
Comparing the results from Table 3 and Table 4, we find that if women have published
less articles in EconLit on average, it is because of the women who have not published at all.
Once we have controlled for this selection process, published women have had as many papers
published as men, and cited women are cited as often as cited men.
Taking selection into account, older academics do not produce lower quality articles but
they are still more cited. Results on the increasing returns to the average number of authors
per article and to the quantity of publications and the size of the co-authorship network for
the average quality of publications are not impacted by the Heckman procedure.
5 The impact of specialisation choices
In this second step, we test the robustness of section 4’s results and analyse the effect of
specialisation choices by including the shares of research output published in each field (JEL
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codes at the first letter level) as a control variable. This tests whether academics specialised
in certain fields are published more or cited more.11
5.1 Specialisation only
We start by regressing publication scores and citation indexes on specialisation shares alone.
As seen in Table 5, French economists specialised in the fields of “General Economics and
Teaching” (A), “Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics” (E), “Microeconomics” (D) and
“History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches” (B) have pub-
lished more articles than the average (by order of magnitude of the coefficients). At the other
extreme, academics specialised in “Business Administration and Business Economics; Mar-
keting; Accounting” (M), “Economic History” (N) and “Health, Education, and Welfare” (I)
have published less single-author equivalent articles.
The French economists’ average quality of publications is higher in the fields of “Math-
ematical and Quantitative Methods” (C), “Microeconomics” (D), “Public Economics” (H),
“Labor and Demographic Economics” (J) and “Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics”
(E) (by order of magnitude of the coefficients). Total publication scores are higher than
average in the same fields (except for Public Economics (H) in CLm), meaning that fields
which are over-represented in terms of quantity as “General Economics and Teaching” (A) or
“History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches” (B) are published
in low-quality journals.
In terms of Google Scholar citation indexes, French economists specialised in the fields of
“Microeconomics” (D), “Labor and Demographic Economics” (J), “Agricultural and Natural
Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics” (Q) and “Mathematical and
Quantitative Methods” (C) (only considering total citations for the latter) are more cited than
the average. At the other extreme, French economists specialised in the fields of “History of
Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches” (B), “Financial Economics”
(G) and “Economic History” (N) are less cited than the average.
Interestingly, comparing Table 5 with Table 3 in section 4, we observe that the R2 of the
model is higher with specialisation shares alone than it is with individual characteristics alone
to explain total publication scores. The total explained variance by specialisation is 13.8% for
CLm and 19.5% for CLh, whereas the total explained variance by individual characteristics
(Table 3) is 3.4% for CLm and 6.6% for CLh. By contrast, the R2 of the model explaining
citation indexes is higher when we introduce individual characteristics alone (8.2% and 10.1%
for Google Scholar total citations and G-index, respectively) than it is when we introduce
specialisation choices alone (2.9% and 3.4% for total citations and G-index, respectively). In
11The number of observations in the regressions falls slightly because some academics have only published
articles for which JEL codes are not recorded in EconLit.
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Table 5: Determinants of publication scores and citation indexes: specialisation only
E CLm CLh CLm/E CLh/E TCit G
% A:General 0.736c 0.418 -0.116 -0.318 -0.852 0.990 0.455
(0.43) (0.57) (1.04) (0.27) (0.78) (0.73) (0.41)
% B:Thought 0.401a -0.127 -1.751a -0.528a -2.152a -0.770a -0.537a
(0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.07) (0.18) (0.21) (0.12)
% C:Maths. 0.104 1.172a 3.548a 1.068a 3.444a 0.747c 0.351
(0.24) (0.35) (0.70) (0.16) (0.52) (0.43) (0.23)
% D:Micro. 0.506a 1.344a 3.466a 0.838a 2.959a 0.645a 0.358a
(0.11) (0.16) (0.31) (0.07) (0.23) (0.19) (0.10)
% E:Macro. 0.642a 0.873a 1.427a 0.231b 0.785a -0.028 0.023
(0.16) (0.20) (0.39) (0.09) (0.30) (0.24) (0.13)
% F:Inter. 0.030 0.039 0.097 0.009 0.067 -0.240 -0.106
(0.14) (0.19) (0.36) (0.09) (0.28) (0.26) (0.14)
% G:Finance -0.112 -0.062 -0.084 0.050 0.028 -0.401b -0.228b
(0.11) (0.14) (0.26) (0.07) (0.21) (0.19) (0.11)
% H:Public 0.070 0.398 1.513a 0.329a 1.443a -0.027 0.044
(0.21) (0.27) (0.55) (0.13) (0.44) (0.34) (0.19)
% I:Health -0.467b -0.428c -0.450 0.039 0.017 -0.084 -0.034
(0.21) (0.26) (0.47) (0.10) (0.35) (0.32) (0.20)
% J:Labor 0.146 0.429a 1.301a 0.283a 1.155a 0.431b 0.251b
(0.12) (0.16) (0.33) (0.08) (0.27) (0.20) (0.12)
% K:Law -0.304 -0.616 -1.065 -0.312c -0.761 -0.722 -0.308
(0.33) (0.41) (0.72) (0.17) (0.53) (0.63) (0.32)
% L:I.O. -0.156 -0.275c -0.467 -0.119c -0.311 0.205 0.080
(0.12) (0.16) (0.31) (0.07) (0.23) (0.21) (0.12)
% M:Business -1.059a -1.641a -3.304a -0.582a -2.245a -0.021 -0.015
(0.13) (0.16) (0.27) (0.07) (0.21) (0.34) (0.19)
% N:History -0.513c -1.075b -2.314b -0.562a -1.801a -1.128c -0.693c
(0.31) (0.44) (0.90) (0.20) (0.70) (0.63) (0.39)
% O:Develop. -0.133 -0.245 -0.720b -0.112 -0.587b -0.005 0.042
(0.13) (0.17) (0.32) (0.08) (0.24) (0.25) (0.14)
% P:Systems 0.163 -0.134 -1.094b -0.297b -1.257a -0.306 -0.205
(0.27) (0.31) (0.53) (0.13) (0.39) (0.48) (0.26)
% Q:Agr. -0.024 0.090 0.595c 0.114 0.619a 0.404b 0.421a
(0.12) (0.16) (0.31) (0.07) (0.24) (0.19) (0.11)
% R:Urban -0.031 -0.161 -0.582c -0.130c -0.551b 0.309 0.102
(0.13) (0.16) (0.33) (0.08) (0.27) (0.23) (0.14)
Constant 0.986a 3.113a -1.423a 2.127a -2.409a 3.262a 1.727a
(0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
R2 0.058 0.138 0.195 0.085 0.160 0.029 0.034
Observations 1923 1923 1923 1923 1923 1835 1835
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. E = number of
single-author equivalent articles in EconLit. CLm and CLh are publication scores with a low and high degree
of convexity in the journal weighting scheme, respectively. CLm/E and CLh/E = average quality and top
quality. TC = Google Scholar total citations. G = Google Scholar G-index.
any case, the variance explained by individual characteristics is weak compared with what
is found in the literature on wage equations for instance (in which individual characteristics
often explain between 30 and 40% of wages, a measure of labour productivity). In academic
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research, specialisation choices appear to be a stronger determinant of publication outcome
than the individual variables we considered in section 4, while the reverse is true for citations.
Now we need to assess whether the conclusions we presented in section 4 are driven by the
omitted specialisation variables or if the two sets of variables correspond to different effects.
5.2 Specialisation and individual characteristics
We now introduce both specialisation patterns and individual characteristics. We conclude
from Table 6 that the average number of authors per article is the only individual character-
istic that matters for explaining total publication scores and citation indexes. As found in
section 4, it has a negative impact on the quantity of published articles and a positive impact
on average quality of publications, total publication scores (except in CLm) and citation in-
dexes. Coefficients associated with age, its square and gender are never significant anymore,
underlining the fact that the demographic impact on total publication scores observed in
section 4 was in fact due to specialisation choices.
This contrasts with results on the average quality of publications, which is still impacted,
in the same order of magnitude, by increasing returns to quantity and size of the co-authorship
network. Then we also observe that French academics in economics specialised in the fields
of “Microeconomics” (D) and “Labor and Demographic Economics” (J) have more articles
of a higher average quality published, hence reach higher total publication scores and are
more cited. French economists specialised in the fields of “Macroeconomics and Monetary
Economics” (E), “Mathematical and Quantitative Methods” (C) and “Public Economics”
(H) also have higher publication scores but are not more cited than the average. At the other
extreme, academics specialised in the fields of “History of Economic Thought, Methodology,
and Heterodox Approaches” (B) and “Economic History” (N) publish lower-quality articles
and are less cited than the average, whereas academics specialised in “Business Administration
and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting” (M) and “Urban, Rural, and Regional
Economics” (R) also publish lower-quality articles but are not less cited.
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Table 6: Determinants of publication scores and citation indexes: specialisation and individual
characteristics
E CLm CLh CLm/E CLh/E TCit G
Women -0.390 -0.714 -2.239 -0.278 -1.597c 0.236 0.094
(0.62) (0.84) (1.68) (0.29) (0.89) (0.84) (0.46)
Age 0.050 0.039 0.079 -0.022 -0.018 0.051 0.027
(0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Authors number -0.338a 0.094 1.232a 0.203b 0.880a 1.025a 0.954a
(0.08) (0.10) (0.19) (0.09) (0.27) (0.15) (0.09)
Quantity 0.129a 0.685a
(0.03) (0.08)
Network size 0.167a 0.565a
(0.04) (0.14)
% A:General 0.273 0.099 -0.168 -0.189 -0.559 0.400 0.222
(0.36) (0.53) (1.06) (0.28) (0.83) (0.73) (0.39)
% B:Thought 0.216c -0.146 -1.355a -0.374a -1.665a -0.631a -0.346a
(0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.07) (0.21) (0.22) (0.12)
% C:Maths. 0.080 0.978a 2.865a 0.871a 2.675a 0.318 0.043
(0.22) (0.34) (0.69) (0.14) (0.41) (0.39) (0.20)
% D:Micro. 0.581a 1.354a 3.326a 0.640a 2.149a 0.731a 0.377a
(0.11) (0.16) (0.31) (0.06) (0.19) (0.17) (0.10)
% E:Macro. 0.602a 0.796a 1.244a 0.081 0.109 -0.016 0.050
(0.16) (0.20) (0.38) (0.08) (0.25) (0.23) (0.13)
% F:Inter. 0.022 0.059 0.200 0.027 0.137 -0.200 -0.069
(0.14) (0.19) (0.36) (0.08) (0.23) (0.25) (0.13)
% G:Finance -0.004 0.040 0.030 0.041 0.025 -0.215 -0.141
(0.10) (0.13) (0.26) (0.06) (0.20) (0.17) (0.09)
% H:Public 0.106 0.379 1.356b 0.238b 1.106a -0.006 0.028
(0.21) (0.27) (0.55) (0.11) (0.37) (0.32) (0.18)
% I:Health -0.352c -0.365 -0.513 0.076 0.225 -0.165 -0.142
(0.19) (0.25) (0.49) (0.09) (0.30) (0.30) (0.18)
% J:Labor 0.332a 0.592a 1.452a 0.172b 0.737a 0.634a 0.309a
(0.11) (0.16) (0.32) (0.08) (0.23) (0.19) (0.11)
% K:Law -0.140 -0.427 -0.753 -0.257 -0.475 -0.284 -0.055
(0.33) (0.40) (0.72) (0.18) (0.58) (0.51) (0.26)
% L:I.O. -0.083 -0.247 -0.539c -0.151b -0.394b 0.204 0.037
(0.12) (0.16) (0.30) (0.06) (0.19) (0.19) (0.11)
% M:Business -1.102a -1.657a -3.249a -0.325a -1.097a -0.137 -0.111
(0.12) (0.16) (0.30) (0.08) (0.22) (0.31) (0.18)
% N:History -0.621c -1.123b -2.215b -0.370b -0.990c -1.065b -0.550b
(0.35) (0.47) (0.94) (0.18) (0.58) (0.48) (0.26)
% O:Develop. -0.081 -0.190 -0.643b -0.092 -0.483b 0.060 0.078
(0.13) (0.17) (0.32) (0.07) (0.22) (0.25) (0.14)
% P:Systems 0.051 -0.093 -0.679 -0.171 -0.834b -0.126 -0.022
(0.27) (0.32) (0.55) (0.12) (0.37) (0.49) (0.25)
% Q:Agr. 0.094 0.073 0.229 -0.059 -0.019 0.171 0.194c
(0.13) (0.17) (0.32) (0.07) (0.21) (0.20) (0.11)
% R:Urban 0.025 -0.124 -0.588c -0.157b -0.646a 0.328 0.100
(0.13) (0.16) (0.32) (0.07) (0.24) (0.22) (0.14)
Selection 0.374 1.318 6.954 1.088 6.972 -7.935 -3.857
(3.26) (4.42) (8.77) (1.49) (4.56) (9.93) (5.48)
Constant -0.454 1.722 -4.994 2.278b -4.078 0.934 0.190
(1.74) (2.36) (4.69) (0.90) (2.70) (1.51) (0.84)
R2 0.143 0.109 0.239 0.457 0.570 0.147 0.176
Observations 1923 1923 1923 1923 1923 1835 1835
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. E = number of
single-author equivalent articles in EconLit. CLm and CLh are publication scores with a low and high degree
of convexity in the journal weighting scheme, respectively. CLm/E and CLh/E = average quality and top
quality. TC = Google Scholar total citations. G = Google Scholar G-index. “Selection” is the inverse of Mill’s
ratio from columns 1 (for publications) and 7 (for citations) of Table 4.
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6 The patterns of knowledge diffusion
Finally, we compare citation indexes and publication scores to assess whether they measure
the same dimensions of research productivity. The above analysis shows that this is not fully
the case, since the effects of certain variables differ in significance and magnitude for the two
types of variables. To go further into the analysis, we regress Google Scholar total citation
indexes and G-indexes on EconLit publication scores, age, gender, specialisation fields, team
size and co-author networks. This allows us to analyse the patterns and determinants of
knowledge diffusion, that is the number of citations received everything else being equal,
including the number and quality of publications. In other words, publication scores and
individual citations could differ only because the former are more noisy (because quality is
assessed at the journal level and not at the individual level), but not on average. If we
show that some variables explain the gap between the two, this means that citations and
publication scores do not measure exactly the same dimensions of productivity. And this also
allows us to quantify the determinants of the non-random divergence of citations with respect
to publication scores, i.e., the driving forces behind citations, reflecting knowledge diffusion,
at identical levels of publication.
6.1 Citations regressed on publications and specialisation
We start by regressing citation indexes on publication scores (quantity and average quality of
publications) and specialisation shares to assess whether citation patterns differ from one field
to another. Unsurprisingly, academics who publish more and in journals of higher quality are
more cited. This confirms that Google Scholar citation indexes capture both the quantity and
quality aspects of publication records. In Table 7, the total R2 of the model is slightly higher
when the average quality of publications is measured with a high degree of convexity in the
journal weighting scheme. With this measure, having published five single-author equivalent
articles instead of four increases Google Scholar total citations by 22.4% and the Google
Scholar G-index by 11.9%.12 On top of that, increasing the average publication top quality
by 10% increases Google Scholar total citations by 2.1% and the Google Scholar G-index by
1.2%.13
Controlling for publication scores, academics specialised in the fields of “Business Adminis-
tration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting” (M), “Industrial Organization” (L),
“Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics”
(Q) and “Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics” (R) ( by order of magnitude of the coeffi-
cients) are relatively more cited. At the other extreme, academics specialised in the fields of
121.250.907 − 1 and 1.250.503 − 1, respectively.
131.10.221 − 1 and 1.10.126 − 1, respectively.
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Table 7: Citation indexes regressed on publication scores and specialisation
TCit G TCit G TCit G
Quantity 1.086a 0.605a 0.970a 0.543a 0.907a 0.503a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Average quality 0.697a 0.377a
(0.05) (0.03)
Average top quality 0.221a 0.126a
(0.02) (0.01)
% A:General 0.103 -0.040 0.498 0.174 0.487 0.179
(0.72) (0.39) (0.76) (0.41) (0.76) (0.42)
% B:Thought -1.156a -0.752a -0.732a -0.523a -0.597a -0.434a
(0.19) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11)
% C:Maths. 0.712b 0.332b -0.029 -0.069 -0.032 -0.092
(0.30) (0.15) (0.30) (0.16) (0.30) (0.15)
% D:Micro. 0.101 0.054 -0.464a -0.251a -0.504a -0.291a
(0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08)
% E:Macro. -0.699a -0.351a -0.780a -0.395a -0.752a -0.381a
(0.20) (0.11) (0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.11)
% F:Inter. -0.265 -0.119 -0.276 -0.126 -0.293 -0.136
(0.21) (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.21) (0.11)
% G:Finance -0.225 -0.130 -0.273c -0.156c -0.250c -0.144c
(0.16) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08)
% H:Public -0.223 -0.065 -0.482c -0.205 -0.570b -0.263c
(0.28) (0.16) (0.27) (0.15) (0.27) (0.15)
% I:Health 0.332 0.198 0.283 0.171 0.272 0.163
(0.22) (0.13) (0.23) (0.14) (0.22) (0.14)
% J:Labor 0.349b 0.205b 0.178 0.112 0.130 0.080
(0.15) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09)
% K:Law -0.405 -0.132 -0.238 -0.041 -0.313 -0.079
(0.56) (0.29) (0.53) (0.28) (0.51) (0.27)
% L:I.O. 0.418b 0.198c 0.493a 0.239b 0.467a 0.226b
(0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10)
% M:Business 1.203a 0.667a 1.504a 0.831a 1.525a 0.851a
(0.34) (0.19) (0.34) (0.19) (0.33) (0.19)
% N:History -0.854 -0.540 -0.576 -0.389 -0.570 -0.378
(0.60) (0.39) (0.57) (0.37) (0.58) (0.37)
% O:Develop. 0.166 0.138 0.227 0.170 0.278 0.201c
(0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.20) (0.11)
% P:Systems -0.393 -0.254 -0.172 -0.134 -0.087 -0.079
(0.31) (0.17) (0.31) (0.17) (0.30) (0.16)
% Q:Agr. 0.422b 0.431a 0.329b 0.380a 0.273 0.346a
(0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09)
% R:Urban 0.413b 0.160 0.509b 0.212c 0.536a 0.230c
(0.21) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12)
Constant 2.126a 1.094a 0.752a 0.349a 2.827a 1.494a
(0.08) (0.04) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05)
R2 0.426 0.423 0.481 0.474 0.482 0.481
Observations 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Quantity:
number of single-author equivalent articles in EconLit (E). Average quality and top quality: CLm/E and
CLh/E. TC: Google Scholar total citations. G: Google Scholar G-index.
18
“History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches” (B), “Macroeco-
nomics and Monetary Economics” (E), “Microeconomics” (D), “Public Economics” (H) and
“Financial Economics” (G) are relatively less cited, given their level of publications.
6.2 The determinants of citations when publications have been controlled
for
Finally, we regress citation indexes on publication scores (quantity and average quality of
publications), specialisation, and individual characteristics including co-authorship variables.
The results of section 6.1 are robust to the introduction of individual characteristics, except
that academics specialised in “Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental
and Ecological Economics” (Q) are no longer over-cited and academics specialised in “Fi-
nancial Economics” (G) are no longer under-cited. Controlling for the quantity of published
papers and the average quality of these publications, older academics have slightly higher
total Google Scholar citation scores, which could be due to the fact that their articles were
published longer ago and hence have had more time to be cited. But they do not have higher
G-indexes.
Importantly, at given publication records, academics with a higher average number of
authors per article and with a larger network size (total number of different co-authors) are
significantly more cited. Our interpretation of this result is that larger team sizes generate
more knowledge diffusion through conferences, seminars, informal talks, etc. Also, academics
may generate knowledge diffusion of their new publications through their former co-authors,
which is stronger when they are more numerous. When the average quality (and not the top
quality) is controlled for, a published academic who has on average two co-authors instead
of only one (per article) is cited 9.7% more and has a G-index 20.5% higher.14 Moreover, a
stock of five different co-authors instead of four, meaning a total network size of 6 instead of 5,
increases Google Scholar total citations by 5.7% and the Google Scholar G-index by 4.2%.15
We perform a variance analysis to infer the relative explanatory power of each variable
(or group of variables). To do so, we first calculate the effect of each variable as the product
of the variable and its coefficient. Then, we calculate the standard error of this effect on all
observations and the correlation coefficients between the calculated effects and the dependent
variable. To have an important explanatory power of the dependent variable, the effect of an
explanatory variable should first have a high standard error by comparison with the standard
error of the dependent variable. Most importantly, a variable - or a group of variables - has
a large explanatory power when its effect is largely correlated with the dependent variable.
In Table 9, we perform the variance analysis of the estimations reported in columns 3 and
141.50.229 − 1 and 1.50.460 − 1, respectively.
151.20.303 − 1 and 1.20.225 − 1, respectively.
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5 of Table 8, where the log of Google Scholar total citations is the dependent variable. In
Table 10, we perform the variance analysis of columns 4 and 6 of Table 8, where the log of the
Google Scholar G-index is the dependent variable. In both cases, with a standard error equal
to around 55 − 60% of the dependent variable and a correlation coefficient of around 0.65,
EconLit publication scores are the most important determinants of citation indexes.16 In this
group of variables, the quantity of publications has a much higher explanatory power than
the average quality of these publications with a standard error between 1.5 times and twice as
large and a correlation coefficient 1.5 times as large, whatever the journal weighting scheme.
Then, we observe that other explanatory variables have much weaker explanatory powers of
citation indexes than publication scores. For total Google Scholar citations, even if individual
demographic characteristics (gender and age) have a higher standard error than co-authorship
effects, the correlation coefficient of the latter with the dependent variables are 1.8 times as
large as the correlation coefficients of individual demographic characteristics.17 For Google
Scholar G-indexes, it is even clearer that co-authorship patterns matter more than individ-
ual demographic characteristics, since both standard errors and correlation coefficients with
the dependent variables are higher for co-authorship effects than for individual demographic
characteristics (importantly, correlation coefficients are more than twice as large).18 Hence,
the determinants of publication productivity seems to differ from those in market activities
and encompass network effects that are typical of this activity.
In the “individual demographic characteristics” group of variables, age has the largest
explanatory power. In the “co-authorship patterns” group of variables, network size has a
larger explanatory power than the average number of authors per article. Knowledge diffusion
is driven more by total co-authorship network size than by team size. Finally, even if we
observe some disparities between fields in the citation practices described above, we observe
in Tables 9 and 10 that the measured effects of specialisation shares are very weakly correlated
with the dependent variables, meaning that specialisation patterns have a weak explanatory
power of citation indexes like Google Scholar total citations and G-indexes, when all individual
effects are controlled for. In both Tables, using CLm or CLh to measure journal quality leads
to very similar results.
16 1.021
1.756
= 0.581, 1.037
1.756
= 0.591, 0.532
0.988
= 0.538, 0.544
0.988
= 0.551
17 0.514
0.284
= 1.810, 0.516
0.283
= 1.823
18 0.539
0.256
= 2.105, 0.537
0.255
= 2.106
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Table 8: Determinants of citation indexes controlled for publication scores
TCit G TCit G TCit G
Quantity 0.804a 0.434a 0.744a 0.407a 0.693a 0.381a
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Average quality 0.681a 0.314a
(0.05) (0.03)
Average top quality 0.216a 0.104a
(0.02) (0.01)
Women -0.119c -0.052 -0.070 -0.029 -0.063 -0.025
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Age 0.019 0.007 0.048c 0.020 0.050c 0.022
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Age2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Authors number 0.342b 0.512a 0.229 0.460a 0.199 0.443a
(0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09)
Network size 0.452a 0.294a 0.303a 0.225a 0.280a 0.211a
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
% A:General 0.213 0.135 0.404 0.223 0.368 0.210
(0.68) (0.35) (0.74) (0.37) (0.74) (0.38)
% B:Thought -0.747a -0.396a -0.503a -0.283a -0.399b -0.229b
(0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10)
% C:Maths. 0.274 0.006 -0.338 -0.277c -0.320 -0.280c
(0.28) (0.14) (0.29) (0.15) (0.28) (0.14)
% D:Micro. 0.096 0.014 -0.376a -0.204a -0.406a -0.227a
(0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08)
% E:Macro. -0.610a -0.284a -0.677a -0.315a -0.650a -0.304a
(0.19) (0.11) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10)
% F:Inter. -0.267 -0.112 -0.285 -0.120 -0.302 -0.129
(0.20) (0.10) (0.21) (0.10) (0.20) (0.10)
% G:Finance -0.171 -0.116 -0.200 -0.129c -0.177 -0.118
(0.14) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07)
% H:Public -0.293 -0.138 -0.475c -0.223 -0.552b -0.263c
(0.27) (0.15) (0.25) (0.14) (0.25) (0.14)
% I:Health 0.200 0.066 0.177 0.056 0.173 0.053
(0.23) (0.14) (0.22) (0.14) (0.22) (0.14)
% J:Labor 0.362b 0.155c 0.261c 0.108 0.224 0.088
(0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08)
% K:Law -0.161 0.016 0.004 0.092 -0.073 0.058
(0.50) (0.25) (0.46) (0.23) (0.44) (0.23)
% L:I.O. 0.342b 0.114 0.462a 0.169c 0.444a 0.163c
(0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.10)
% M:Business 1.189a 0.649a 1.451a 0.770a 1.469a 0.783a
(0.32) (0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.31) (0.18)
% N:History -0.759c -0.385 -0.563 -0.294 -0.571 -0.294
(0.41) (0.26) (0.41) (0.25) (0.42) (0.26)
% O:Develop. 0.196 0.155 0.250 0.179c 0.299 0.204c
(0.20) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11)
% P:Systems -0.252 -0.094 -0.135 -0.040 -0.069 -0.006
(0.31) (0.16) (0.32) (0.16) (0.31) (0.16)
% Q:Agr. 0.035 0.105 0.077 0.124 0.047 0.110
(0.17) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09)
% R:Urban 0.353c 0.111 0.466b 0.163 0.495b 0.179
(0.20) (0.12) (0.19) (0.11) (0.19) (0.11)
Constant 0.670 0.153 -1.316b -0.765b 0.682 0.159
(0.65) (0.35) (0.61) (0.34) (0.59) (0.32)
R2 0.482 0.517 0.528 0.548 0.527 0.550
Observations 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835
Standard error between brackets. a, b, c significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Quantity:
number of single-author equivalent articles in EconLit (E). Average quality and top quality: CLm/E and
CLh/E. TC: Google Scholar total citations. G: Google Scholar G-index.
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Table 9: Variance analysis, Google Scholar total citations
CLm as quality CLh as top quality
Stand. error Correlation Stand. error Correlation
Explained: GS Total citations 1.756 1.000 1.756 1.000
EconLit Publications 1.021 0.659 1.037 0.662
Quantity 0.782 0.618 0.728 0.618
Average quality 0.465 0.410 . .
Average top quality . . 0.501 0.472
Individual effects 0.328 0.284 0.332 0.283
Gender 0.031 0.171 0.028 0.171
Age 0.320 0.275 0.325 0.275
Coauthorship 0.287 0.514 0.262 0.516
Authors number 0.062 0.157 0.054 0.157
Network size 0.251 0.547 0.232 0.547
Specialisation 0.333 0.040 0.330 0.031
Residuals 1.206 0.687 1.207 0.688
The table presents the variance analysis of the estimation reported in Table 8 columns (3) and (5). ’Stand.
error’ columns report the standard error of the effect of a variable or a group of variables. For the first line,
it reports the standard error of the dependent variable. ’Correlation’ columns report the correlation between
the effect of a variable or of a group of variables and the dependent variable.
Table 10: Variance analysis, Google Scholar G-index
CLm as quality CLh as top quality
Stand. error Correlation Stand. error Correlation
Explained: G-index 0.988 1.000 0.988 1.000
EconLit Publications 0.532 0.653 0.544 0.660
Quantity 0.427 0.611 0.400 0.611
Average quality 0.215 0.404 . .
Average top quality . . 0.241 0.476
Individual effects 0.160 0.256 0.163 0.255
Gender 0.013 0.159 0.011 0.159
Age 0.157 0.249 0.160 0.249
Coauthorship 0.270 0.539 0.256 0.537
Authors number 0.125 0.258 0.120 0.258
Network size 0.187 0.607 0.175 0.607
Specialisation 0.169 0.043 0.169 0.031
Residuals 0.664 0.672 0.663 0.671
The table presents the variance analysis of the estimation reported in Table 8 columns (4) and (6). ’Stand.
error’ columns report the standard error of the effect of a variable or a group of variables. For the first line,
it reports the standard error of the dependent variable. Columns ’Correlation’ reports the correlation between
the effect of a variable or a group of variables and the dependent variable.
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7 Conclusion
We study the individual determinants of EconLit publication scores and Google Scholar cita-
tion indexes of French academic economists. We show that when co-author patterns have been
controlled for (the average number of authors per article and the total co-author network size),
gender and age do not matter anymore, except for the probabilities of being published and
of being cited at least once. Moreover, we carefully analyse the role of the specialisation pat-
terns of the academics. Those specialised in “Microeconomics” and “Labor and Demographic
Economics” publish more articles of a higher average quality and are more cited.
Importantly, we exhibit increasing returns to quantity and to co-author network size for
the average quality of publications, whatever the chosen weighting scheme of journals, and
increasing returns to the average number of authors per article for all research output tak-
ing quality into account, including citation indexes. Finally, by looking at the pattern of
knowledge diffusion, we find that publication scores are the most important determinant of
citation indexes. Nevertheless, we also show that team size and co-author networks constitute
its second largest explanatory group of variables. Academics who publish more papers and
of higher quality are more cited, which was expected. Now, we also show that academics
working in larger co-author teams and who have a larger total co-author network are also
more cited. Our interpretation is the following. Co-authored articles are presented in confer-
ences, seminars and workshops by their several authors. Moreover, academics discuss their
new findings with their peers, including those with whom they have already worked. Both
attitudes generate more knowledge diffusion, which we measure through citations. Therefore
we confirm the widespread intuition that networks do matter for citations.
It has already been shown that citations are an important determinant of academic wages
and that network effects matter for academic promotions (see McDowell and Smith (1992),
Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008) or Zinovyevay and Bagues (2012) for instance). We
prove here that network effects matter for citations. Therefore, data on wage and position
would allow us to disentangle the direct effects of networks and their indirect effects through
citations, in the explanation of wages. Also, studying the sources of citations (the citing
academics/articles) would allow us to build a more precise picture of the patterns of knowledge
diffusion. Unfortunately, Google Scholar does not provide such information yet. Finally, it
would be interesting to perform some more structural estimations or to benefit from richer
datasets (with a panel dimension possibly and some instruments) to deal with endogeneity
concerns and to infer the directions of causalities, as Bramoulle´, Djebbari and Fortin (2009)
propose, for instance, to identify peer effects in recreational services. This would improve
on the correlations established here and move us to more causal interpretations. This is a
difficult exercise though, which awaits further research.
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Appendix
A Top 50 journals
Table 11: Top 50 journals
Journal Rank Quality Top quality
quarterly journal of economics 1 100.0 100.0
american economic review 2 98.1 94.4
journal of political economy 3 96.2 89.1
econometrica 4 95.7 87.7
review of economic studies 5 81.0 53.1
journal of financial economics 6 80.6 52.4
journal of monetary economics 7 75.8 43.6
review of economics and statistics 8 74.1 40.7
journal of economic theory 9 72.8 38.5
journal of finance 10 72.2 37.6
journal of econometrics 11 68.6 32.3
economic journal 12 64.5 26.8
rand journal of economics 13 63.7 25.8
journal of public economics 14 62.0 23.9
journal of international economics 15 61.5 23.3
journal of the european economic association 16 57.0 18.5
european economic review 17 55.2 16.8
journal of labor economics 18 55.1 16.7
international economic review 19 54.7 16.4
games and economic behavior 20 54.1 15.8
review of financial studies 21 49.1 11.8
journal of business and economic statistics 22 48.1 11.1
journal of health economics 23 43.9 8.5
journal of development economics 24 42.7 7.8
journal of human resources 25 42.2 7.5
journal of money, credit, and banking 26 41.9 7.3
journal of law and economics 27 40.7 6.8
journal of accounting and economics 28 40.5 6.6
journal of urban economics 29 40.0 6.4
journal of environmental economics and management 30 37.6 5.3
journal of economic growth 31 37.4 5.2
journal of economic dynamics and control 32 36.1 4.7
journal of economic behavior and organization 33 35.8 4.6
world development 34 35.8 4.6
review of economic dynamics 35 35.3 4.4
journal of applied econometrics 36 35.0 4.3
economic theory 37 34.0 3.9
econometric theory 38 33.7 3.8
journal of law, economics, and organization 39 32.1 3.3
health economics 40 31.5 3.1
american journal of agricultural economics 41 31.4 3.1
journal of industrial economics 42 31.1 3.0
international journal of industrial organization 43 31.0 3.0
journal of economic history 44 31.0 3.0
journal of economic perspectives 45 30.5 2.8
economics letters 46 30.4 2.8
journal of risk and uncertainty 47 30.0 2.7
scandinavian journal of economics 48 30.0 2.7
journal of financial and quantitative analysis 49 29.7 2.6
ecological economics 50 29.5 2.6
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